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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEAN E. PARK, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ALTA DITCH & CANAL COMPANY, 
a corporation; METROPOLITAN 
WATER DISTRICT OF OREM, a 
public corporation; and OREM CITY, 
a municipal corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
11345 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
ALTA DITCH & CANAL COMPANY 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Respondent Alta Ditch & Canal Company does not 
differ with Appellant on his Statement of the Gase, dispo-
sition of the matter by the lower court 1and lthe relief sought 
by him through this appeal. However, .the Statement of 
Facts is incomplete, as substantial evidence which supports 
this Respondent's position in the case has not been stated. 
Therefore, in order to place ithe issues in their proper fac-
tual setting, counsel) for Respondent Alta Ditch & Cana1 
Company will set forth herein its own statement of facts. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent A'ltta Ditch & Canal Company wil'l be called 
herein "ALTA" and the old defunct corporation which was 
the predecessor in interest of Respondent Alta Ditch & 
Canal Company will be called herein "OLD ALTA". This 
Statement of Facts is taken from the record and particu-
larly from the Findings of Fact which underlie the judg-
ment appealed from. 
1. The water of Alta Spring. 
Prior to May 20, 1893, the waiters of the Alta Spring 
in Utah County were devefoped and a distribution system 
was constructed through which it was conveyed to prop-
erty on the Orem Bench (R. 87, Ex. 3, Vol. 2, Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 2-3). 
2. Conveyance of all water rights in Alta Spring and 
all property rights in the distribution system of 
Old Alta. 
The early owners of all water rights in Alta Spring 
and of all property rights of every kind in the distribution 
system became the incorporators of the old Alta Ditch com-
pany on May 20, 1893. At that lt!ime, they conveyed all of 
their interest in both the Alta Spring water and the distri-
bution facilities to the corporation (R. 87, Ex. 3, Vol. 2, 
Findings of Facit and Conclusions of Law, pp. 2-3). 
3. Expiration of the charter of Old Alta. 
The charter of Alta Ditch & Canal Company (Old) 
expired on May 20, 1943. At the time that it became de-
funct, its principal asset was water from the Alta Springs 
and the irriigation system developed for the distribution 
thereof to its shareholders. There were outstanding filie 
originally issued 288 shares of stock in Old Alita, of which 
186-5/6 shares were then owned by individuals and 101-1/6 
shares were owned by Orem City (R. 88, Ex. 7, p. l; Ex. 3, 
Vol. 1, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 5-6). 
4. Organization of Alta. 
Respondent Alta Ditch & Canal Company was organ-
ized on November 26, 1946 by all of the individual stock-
holders owning 186-5/6 shares of the old corporation, with 
articles and powers similar to those of Old Alita. Orem 
City, the owner of the remaining 101-1/6 shares of stock 
in the old corporation, did not join with the individual 
stockholders in forming the new corporation '(R. 88). 
Verena C. Crandall, predecessor in interest of the Appellant 
here, subscribed to the Articles of Incorporation which 
recited that her interest, and all interests of the other in-
corporators of Alta in the waters of Alta Ditch and the 
distribution facilities, had been conveyed to Alta (Ex. 7). 
5. Civil Action No. 15,460 filed in the District Court 
of Utah County by Orem City against Alta and 
others . 
.Ailthough Orem City did not participate in the forma-
tion of rtfu.e new Alta Ditch & Canal Company, it did for a 
number of years consent fo the administration of all of the 
waters of the Alta Ditch by the new corporation. However, 
Orem City sought to change :the point of diversion of its 
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water rights represented by its 101-1/6 shares in the old 
corporation. The officers and directors of the new cor-
poration refused to consent to the proposed change and 
Orem City filed Civil Action No. 15,460 in the District 
Court of Utah County wherein it was held in substance 
that the legal title to the water, water rights and water 
system involved was in the old corporation, and not in its 
shareholders, and that the shareholders, the individual 
water users, were not the real parties in interest and were 
not necessary parties to the action. It ordered that the 
trustees of the old corporation forthwith proceed to liqui-
date the affairs of the old corporation and to convey to the 
"equitable owners" thereof or their successors in interest 
all of the property, assets, rights and privileges owne~l by 
the old corporation, including Orem City, which was en-
titled to 101-l/6./288ths thereof. Orem City was further 
granted the right to change the point of diYersion of all or 
any part of the water represented by its 101-1/6i288ths 
(34.82%) of the total rights of the said old Alta Ditch & 
Canal Company ( R. 88-9) . 
The foregoing facts are quoted from Finding X o. 5 of 
the Findings of Fact which underlie the judgment appealed 
from. Although Appellant does not challenge Finding X o. 
5, it does quote out of context the follo"ing single finding 
of the trial court in Case No. 15,460 : 
''That the new Alta Ditch and Canal Company 
has acquired no title in. or to, the said Alta Ditch 
or water and has no right to control or liquidate 
said property or rights beyond that which may be 
accorded to it by common consent of the persons in-
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terested, the right to regulate and administer the 
property for the purposes of liquidation remaining 
with the old corporation until its winding up in ac-
cordance with the provision of this decree ... " 
The language so quoted by AppeHant may, at first 
blush, appear to be inconsistent with certain parts of Find-
ing No. 5. It is, therefore, deemed by Respondent Alta 
Ditch & Canal Company necessary to quote other pertinen't 
parts of the record in Case No. 15,460 to place the matter 
in proper perspective. Those portions of the record are 
quoted and discussed in Appendix I attached hereto. An 
examinaJtion thereof demonstrates that the trial court in 
Case No. 15,460 found and held in substance as follows: 
a) All of the owners of Alta Ditch waters and 
diversion facilities were incorporators of the Old Alta 
Ditch & Canal Company. 
b) By executing the articles of the old incor-
poration, the incorporators conveyed all of itheir pro-
prietary interests therein to the old corporation which 
thereafter held legal title thereto. 
c) After incorporaJtion, the only interest of the 
incorporators in the water and distribution facilities 
was as a stockholder of the old corporation. 
d) When the charter of the old corporation ex-
pired, the corporation became defunct, buit still con-
tinued to exist for the limited purpose of winding up 
its affairs and conveying legal title to its assets to the 
parties entitled thereto. 
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e) The shareholders of the old corporation did 
not become tenants in common of the underlying assets 
of the old corporation. Their only remedy with respect 
to the old corporation was to file an action against the 
Director-Trustees of the old corporation to compel 
winding up and conveyance of remaining property to 
the parties entitled thereto. 
f) Although the old corporation held the legal 
title to the water, water rights and distribution facili-
ties involved, the equitable title was held by the new 
corporation and by Orem City. 
g) The only necessary parties in the action by 
Orem City affecting rights to and use of such water, 
water rights and facilities were: ( 1) the old corpora-
tion with bare legal title; (2) its Director-Trustees 
who controlled its action; and (3) the new corporation 
with equitable title to a 188/288th interest. 
6. Failure to comply with the Trial Court's decree 
in Civil Case No. 15,460. 
The Director-Trustees of the old defunct corporation 
did nort comply with the decree of the Trial Court in wind-
ing up the affairs of the old corporation. Neither did they 
convey the legal title to the assets of the defunct corpora-
tion, including its water and water rights, to Orem City 
and to the new corporation as directed by the Court. How-
ever, since the date of the entry of the decree, Orem City 
has utilized irts 34.82 % of the water and water rights of the 
old corporation independently under claim of rig1ht under 
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the di vision arrangement provided in the decree in Civil 
No. 15,460. The balance of the water and water rights in-
itially owned by the old corporation (except for an indi-
vidual culinary right not here in issue) has been admin-
istered under claim of right by the new corporation since 
the date of said decree (R. 89). In this regard, it is of 
particular signifi0ance to note that Appellant himself per-
sonally signed the ,stipulation which resulted in the amend-
ment of the judgmenrt and decree in Civil Ca:se No. 15,460 
and was one of the Director-Trustees who faHed to comply 
with the decree of the Trial Court in conveying the legal 
title of the defunct corporation to Orem Cirty and to the 
new corporation. (See Tr. 117-8; Ex. 3, Vol. 2, Stipulation; 
quoted in pertinent part in the Appendix attached hereto). 
7. Acquisition by the Appellant of Stock in Alta. 
Verena C. Crandall, predecessor in interest of the Ap-
pellant, acquired Certificate No. 2'13 representing two 
shares of stock in the old corporation on November 4, 1945, 
approximately one year prior to the incorporation of the 
new Alta Dirtch & Canal Company. In November of 1946, 
Verena C. Crandall subscribed to the Articles of Incorpora-
tion of the new corporation and thereby conveyed to the 
new corporation all of her right, title and interest in the 
said two shares of stock and assets of the old corporation 
in exchange for two shares of stock in the new corporation. 
Thereafter, Verena C. Crandall transferred said two shares 
of stock in the new corporation to Robert Calder and stock 
Certificate No. 220 was issued by the new corporation to 
Robert Calder on May 5, 1947. 1In 1949, Appellant acquired 
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said two shares of stock evidenced by Certificate No. 220 
from Robert Calder and the transfer thereof was made on 
the books of the new corporation on March 7, 19'51, where-
upon Certificate No. 22'4 representing two shares of stock 
was issued to Appellant (R. 89). 
8. Status of Appellant as a stockholder of Alta. 
From and after the time he acquired his two shares of 
stock in the new corporation, Appellant was treated as a 
srtockholder thereof for al'l purposes. Appellant at all times 
material here affirmatively asserted his status and sfand-
ing as a shareholder of the new corporation. He was as-
sessed his pro-:riata share in the years when income was in-
sufficient to meet opera ting expenses and was tendered his 
pro-raita dividends in years when income exceeded operat-
ing expenses. The Board of Direcitors and the shareholders 
of the new A'lta Ditch & Canal Company have met reguliarly 
since the formation of the corporation and have maintained 
minutes of their meetings. At these regular meetings, the 
affairs of the corporation and its shareholders were dis-
cussed, approval for proposed action was given, assess-
ments were approved, dividends were voted and contracts 
were approved. Appellant as a shareholder received notice 
of all meetings, which he seldom attended. Appellant, him· 
self, at the March 21, 1962 meetJing, seconded the motion to 
re-elect the presently constituted officers (R. 90, 92). 
9. Connection by Appellant to the Orem City culinary 
pipeline. 
Respondent Orem City is the exclusive owner of a 14 
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inch diameter pipeline which is an integral and necessary 
part of its water works system whereby waters to which 
Respondent Orem City is entitled from the Alta Springs, 
either in its own righrt or by agreement and exchange with 
Respondent Alta Ditch & Canal Company, are diverted and 
conveyed by Orem City for 'beneficial use by its inhabitants 
and persons outside of 1its corporate limits. In 1949, Appel-
lant connected into the bottom of said 14 inch pipeline aJt a 
point above his property and from there constructed a 4 
inch steel pipeline to his property. No representative of 
Alta was a party to the discussions leading rto the connec-
tion and construction of the 4 inch pipeline (R. 90-91). 
In 1958, Appellant replaced the 4 inch steel pipeline 
with a 6 inch transite pipeline and equipped the same with 
a meter wt a point where the 6 inch pipeline enters his 
property. Appellant did not consult with representatives 
of either Respondents Alta Ditch & Canal Company, Orem 
Oity or Metropolitan Water District of Orem concerning 
this change. The connection to Respondent Orem City's 14 
inch pipeline was without corporate authorization from 
Alta and the water which Appellant has been permitted by 
Orem City to divert and take ,therefrom has been permis-
sive only. Appellant's connec'tion to Orem City's 14 inch 
pipeline and his permissive use of water therefrom has 
been terminated and Appellant has been so notified by 
Orem City. In making said connection and constructing 
said p~peline and using water conveyed thereby, Appellant 
did not rely upon any act or any failure to act of any rep-
resentative of Alta (R. 91). 
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10. Appellant claims only an arrangement 1cith Orem 
City authorizing connection 1cith its pipeline and 
diversion of water through the pipeline. 
Significantly, Appellant does not claim any agreement 
as against Alta for authorization to connect with or divert 
water from the Orem City line. He has no stan:iing here 
to assert such claim for the Court below specifically found 
that no such agreement existed, either in writing or other-
wise, between Appellant and Alta. This finding as to Alta 
is compelled by the evidence. In describing the absence of 
any participation by Alta in the transaction leading to such 
connection and diversion, Appellant testified: "I didn't 
have nothing to do with Alta Ditch Company. I asked per-
mission of Orem City is all" (Tr. 100-01). He further testi-
fied that he "did not" get permission from Alta (Tr. 101) 
and that when he learned of the water agreements he "·ent 
to Orem City, not to Alta, to work out the problem (Tr. 
100). Such admissions by Appellant are supported by Alta 
minutes (See Exs. 20, 21). 
11. Agreements 1cith respect to the Alta 1cater and 
distribution facilities. 
On l\Iarch 19, 1956, Respondents Alta Ditch & Canal 
Company, Metropolitan 'Vater District of Orem and Orem 
City entered into an agreement in "Titing entitled "Pipe-
line and 'Vater Rental Agreement" "·hich pro\ided for, 
among other things, the construction of a pipeline from 
Alta Springs to Orem City's head house and point of diver-
sion on Alta Ditch and for the leasing to l\Ietropolitan 
Water District of Orem and Orem City of the entire share 
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of Alta in and to the waters of Alta Springs during the 
period from October 15 to May 1 of the year following and 
fo1· each year thereafter up to and including May 1, 1977. 
The court below specifically found that this agreement was 
duly authorized and executed by the parties, is valid and in 
full force and effect and is binding upon Appellant (R. 92). 
On May 16, 1958, Respondent Alta, Metropolitan 
Water District of Orem and Orem City entered into a 
Water Exchange Agreement in writing wherein it was 
agreed, among other things, that Metropolitan Water Di&-
trict of Orem and Orem City would be entitled to the entire 
share of Alta in and to the waters of Alta Springs during 
the period from May 1 to October 31 of each year, and in 
exchange therefor, Metropolitan Water Districtof Orem and 
Orem City agreed to supply to Alta greater amounts of water 
and in addition thereto to pay to it a cash consideration. 
The court below found that this Water Exchange Agree-
ment was duly authorized and executed by the parties. It 
expired by its own terms on November 1, 1965. On June 
28, 1966, the Respondents entered into a new agreement 
embodying the terms of the old agreement dated May 16, 
19G8 for a new ten year term, with some modifications. 
Similarly, the court below specifically found that this 
agreement dated June 28, 1966 was duly authorized and 
executed by the parties, is valid and is in full force and 
effect and binding upon the Appellant (R. 92). 
Also pertinent on this appeal, inasmuch as Appellant 
seeks to quiet title to a portion of the water and water 
rights and use of the distribution facilities, is a loan agree-
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ment between Alta and the Srbate of Utah executed on Aug-
ust 6, 1956 (See Ex. 41). The 1agreement provides, among 
other things, for the transfer of title by Alta in fee simple 
of all real estate upon which its water system is con-
structed, the granting to the 'State of Utah of an easement 
to use all of 1:Jhe distribution facilities of Alta, and the con-
veyiance, ass:ignment and quitcl1aim to the 'State of Utah of 
all of the water and waiter rights of Alta in the klta Springs 
and the distribution system. The State of Utah, now hold-
ing legal title to all of the property involved, is a necessary 
party but has not been sued as a party in this proceeding. 
Finally, Alta and Orem City entered into an additional 
agreement on March 16, 1964. 'Through this Agreement, 
the parties jointly expended approximately $32,000 in cov-
ering the Ailta Spring. This aotion was taken under threat 
of the State of Utah to condemn the water supply (See Ex. 
31) (Tr. 129..:.30). This agreement recites, among other 
things (See Ex. 31) that "Orem and A'lta are owners as 
tenants in common of Alta Springs, Ditch, pipeline, right 
to use the water and water works, Orem being the owner 
of 34.82 % and A1ta being the owner of 65.18 % of 1the same, 
with Orem also owning 41 shares of Alta stock in said 
64.18%.'' 
In summary, all of the Alta Spring winter water was 
leased to Orem City in 1956. Also in 19156, money was bor-
rowed to improve the distribution system and title to the 
water and other property rights was conveyed to the State 
of Utah. In 1958, the balance of the water of Alta Spring 
owned by Alta was 1eased to Orem City in exchange for 
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cash and a greater amount of Deer Creek water. This 
agreement was renewed in 1956. Only through these vari-
ous agreements has Orem City been able to supply to Ap-
pellant the continuous flow of Alta Spring water which he 
seeks through this proceeding. In 1964, an 1agreement was 
signed to provide cover for the Alta Ditch WM.ch recited 
that Orem City and Al.ta Ditch & Canal Company were the 
owners as tenants in common of all 11igh.ts to use Alita Ditch 
water and through the distribution system. 
93) 
12. Appellant had knowledge of, consented to and 
benefited from the various agreements described 
above. 
In this connection, the Court specifically found: (R. 
"Plaintiff was at all times aware of the Pipe-
line and Water Rental Agreement and the Water 
Excihange Agreements involved herein. He con-
sented thereto, made no objections thereto and bene-
fited :therefrom." 
This finding is not specifically attacked by Appellant 
in statement of "Relief Sought on Appeal", in "Statement 
of Points" or in "Argument" contaiined in his brief. The 
finding is ampiy supported by evidence in the record. Since 
this evidence is reviewed in some detail in argument under 
Point II and Point III, it will not be reviewed separately 
here. 
13. Evidence relating to claimed "estoppel" as against 
Alta. 
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The court specifically found ( R. 93) that "the evidence 
does not contain facts from which findings could be made 
to support plaintiff's (Appellant's) claim of estoppel 
against defendant (Respondent) Alta Ditch & Canal Com-
pany". This finding of the Court likewise is not directly 
attacked by Appellant, it is a correct and proper finding 
and that renders this issue moot on this appeal. 
14. Evidence relating to "quiet title issue". 
Similarly, the court specifically found (R. 93) that 
"the evidence does not contain facts from which findings 
could be made that plaintiff (Appellant) is entitled to quiet 
title to any of the waters of Alta Springs". Similarly, this 
finding is not attacked directly in the Appellant's brief, the 
same is a proper finding and binding upon Appellant and 
accordingly, it cannot be assailed on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. 
APPELLANT HAS NO AGREEMENT OF ANY 
KIND WITH ALTA DITCH & CANAL COM-
PANY WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF FA-
CILITIES OF, OR WATER DISTRIBUTED BY, 
OREM CITY. 
II. 
APPELLANT CONSENTED TO THE VARIOUS 
WATER AGREEMENTS AND IS BOUND BY 
THE PROVISIONS THEREOF. 
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III. 
APPELLANT RATIFIED THE VARIOUS WA-
TER AGREEMENTS AND IS BOUND BY THE 
PROVISIONS THEREOF. 
IV. 
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT AP-
PELLANT NEITHER CONSENTED TO NOR 
RATIFIED THE VARIOUS WATER AGREE-
MENTS, HE IS, NONETHELESS, BOUND BY 
THE PROVISIONS THEREOF. 
v. 
APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT TO USE ALTA 
DITCH WATER BASED UPON AN INTEREST 
IN STOCK OF OLD ALTA. 
VI. 
APPELLANT HAS BEEN AFFORDED ALL 
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES TO WHICH HE 
IS ENTITLED AS A SHAREHOLDER OF 
ALTA. 
VII. 
ALTA HAS NOT INTERFERED WITH OR 
THREATENED TO INTERFERE WITH AP-
PELLANT'S WATER SUPPLY AND NO ES-
TOPPEL CAN ARISE AGAINST ALTA ON 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE. 
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VIII. 
IN ANY EVENT, APPELLANT IS NOT EN-
TITLED TO A "QUIET TITLE" DECREE BE-
CAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF A NECES-
SARY PARTY. 
ARGUMENT 
Preliminary Statement 
First, it is pertinent to note thait ithe bulk of Appel-
l1ant's Brief is aimed at Respondent Alta Ditch & Canal 
Company. This is an obvious exercise of the "red herring 
technique" inasmuch as Appellant's quarrel is not w£th 
Alta but with the other Respondents. For this reason, and 
to place this matter in proper perspective, Alta's first poinrt 
herein will relate to that quarrel between Appellant and the 
other Respondents. 
Second, the bulk of AppeUam's Brief, as 'applied to 
Alta, is dedicated to the easily ,identifiable device of erect-
ing and knocking down a straw man. In Points 1, 2 and 3, 
AppeUant assumes tlrat the various agreements affecting 
his water and water righlts were entered into over his "ob-
jection" and without his "consent". In the argument under 
these points, Appellant wholly ignores the evidence in the 
record and the specific findings 1of fact duly entered by the 
courlt below. For this reason, this Respondent, in its second 
and third points, will attempt to demonstrate both the in-
itial consent of Appellant to such water agreements and 
his subsequent ratification thereof. Certainly this court 
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should be persuaded that Appellant either consented to or 
ratified these agreements, as specifically found by the court 
below, and in that event, all of Appellant's arguments un-
der Points 1, 2 and 3 become fruitless. 
POINT I. 
APPELLANT HAS NO AGREEMENT OF ANY 
KIND WITH ALTA DITCH & CANAL COM-
P ANY WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF FA-
CILITIES OF, OR WATER DISTRIBUTED BY, 
OREM CITY. 
The following facts stand uncontroverted in the record 
in this matter. Appellant's property, upon which he seeks 
to use the water here involved, stands high on the Orem 
Bench. Orem City diverts its decreed share of Alta waters 
into a 14 inch culinary line from Alta Ditch at point above 
Appellant's property. Appellant's pipeline, discussed above, 
is connected to this Orem City Hne. Alta's share of the 
Alta Ditch water flows on down the Alta Ditch to a point 
approximately two miles from and 250 feet below Appel-
lant's property where it is there diverted to irrigate lands 
of Alta shareholders (Tr. 126-7). The other shareholders 
of Alta (except James Ferguson who has an independently 
decreed culinary right) purchase their culinary water from 
Orem City (Tr. 289). They do not take or use any irriga-
tion water from the 14 inch Orem City line. They all divert 
their Alta water for irrigation purposes from Alta Ditch at 
the point approximately 250 feet below and two miles from 
Appellant's property (Tr. 126-7, 289). 'Dhis is true even 
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of the water taken and used by Orem City as a shareholder 
of Alta (Tr. 287-9). Appellant has never requested to take 
Alta Ditch water at some place oither than such diversion 
point below and at some distance from his property. Fur-
thermore, Appellant has never requested a change of p'oint 
of diversion through the Office of the State Engineer (Tr. 
136). Beoouse of the topography of the area, it is not prac-
tical for him to take water at the point where diverted for 
other shareholders of Alta because of the distance involved 
and the costs required to pump the same back up to the 
elevation of his property (Tr. 127-8). 
But in addition to the foregoing, Appellant's particular 
needs and desires could not be satisfied through use of the 
water from Alta Ditch in a manner consistent with use by 
other shareholders for at least two reasons, namely: 
1) He desires to use the water for culinary purposes, 
whereas other shareholders utilize the Alta water for irri-
gation and purchase water for household use from Orem 
City (Tr. 129-31, 289). The contracts ito which reference 
is made above for the covering of the Alta Ditch, one of 
which resulted in transfer of legal title to waiter rights anJ 
water facilities to the State of Utah were beneficial to Ap-
pellant in that they permiltted an improvement of the qual-
ity of the water for culinary purposes (Tr. 129-31). 
2) Appellant desires 1and needs a "conitinuous flow 
of water" (Tr. 121). Burt for the water exchange agree-
ments which are here under attack by Appellant, he would 
have no way, as a shareholder of Alta, to obtain a continu-
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ous flow of water (Tr. 122). But for such agreements, he 
would be entitled only to take water "on turn". His turn, 
represented by his two shares of Alta stock, would author-
ize his use of the full stream of rthe Alta Ditch for 83 min-
utes every eight days and eight hours (Tr. 299). This 
would create two problems : 
a) His pipeline is not sufficiellltly large even to carry 
the complete flow of Alta Ditch waters, and; 
b) The pipe does not have sufficient capacity to store 
enough water to satisfy his needs during the eight 
days and eight hours in which he would be en-
titled to no water whatsoever as a stockholder of 
Alta (Tr. 121-5). 
This second problem is illustrated by the period in 
1966 when the summer water agreement expired, and for 
a short period of time, all parties with a shareholder's in-
terest in the Alta water, including Orem City, were re-
quired to revert to turns. During that time, it was neces-
sary for Appellant to request an "out of turn" filling of his 
pipe (Tr. 269) . During this short period of 1time, Alta ac-
commodated AppeUant and periodically interrupted the 
turn of other shareholders to fill his pipe as a courtesy to 
him. Otherwise, he would have been without water (Tr; 
275). 
Hence, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that 
Appellant has needs for and desires water and water rights 
to which he is not entitled as a shareholder of Alta. For 
that reason, Appellant connected to the Orem City culinary 
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pipeline. In attaching to this pipe and diverting water 
through the same, Appellant did not deal with Alta. He 
did not request the consent of any representative of Alta 
but dealt only and exclusively wilth Orem City (Tr. 100-01). 
When queried as his reason for not contacting Alta, Ap-
pellant testified (Tr. 101-2) : 
"Q. You had what you claim was a deal of 
some sort with Orem City, you were getting your 
water so you didn't communicate with or bother 
Alta Ditch? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. You didn't have any reason to? 
"A. No." 
He further testified (Tr. 100-01) : 
"Q. And you don't claim any consent by Alta 
Ditch to that transaction or any knowledge on their 
part of that transaction? 
"A. I didn't have nothing to do with Alta 
Ditch Company. I asked permission of Orem City 
is all." 
During all of the years here involved (1948 through 
1966), Appellant made no claim or demand of any kind 
with respect to the subject matter of this ·lawsuit against 
Alta until immediately before filing suit .(Tr. 177). His 
quarrel was only with Orem City (Tr. 100-02). It follows 
as a matter of course that Appellant's claim in this proceed-
ing is not against Alta but agiainst Orem City. His rights, 
if any, arise by virtue of a claimed oral agreement with 
Orem City of which Alta was not and is not a party. With-
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out the water agreements which he here attacks, even Orem 
City would be powerless to afford him a "continuous flow" 
of Alta water. However, it is understandable that, faced 
with formidable obstacles in proving and enforcing his 
agreement with Orem City, he has turned in this eleventh 
hour to the innocent bystander, Alta Ditch & Canal Com-
pany. For all of the foregoing reasons, it follows that his 
rights and remedies in this proceeding, if any, run against 
Orem City only. 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT CONSENTED TO THE VARIO US 
WATER AGREEMENTS AND IS BOUND BY 
THE PROVISIONS THEREOF. 
In the first three points of Argument in Appellant's 
Brief, he ignores wholly the specific findings of the court 
below, together with the supporting evidence. Most of the 
evidence, which is uncontroverted, proves that Appellant 
consented to the various water agreements which made it 
possible for him to obtain his desired "continuous flow" 
through his claimed agreement with Orem City. To sup-
port this assertion, we first discuss such findings, and par-
enthetically we menltion thJat they are not the subject of 
any specific atltack in Appellant's Brief or in the statement 
of relief sought through this appeal. Second, we relate the 
evidence which moved the Trial Judge to make the findings 
in favor of Alta. 
1. Findings -
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a) In Finding No. 11 ( R. 91-2) , the Trial Gou rt 
specifically found that the agreement of March 19, 1956 
was "duly authorized and executed by the parties thereto 
and that it is valid and in full force and effect and is bind-
ing upon the plaintiff". 
b) In Finding No. 12 (R. 92), the Trial Judge stated 
that the agreement of May 16, 1958 was "duly authorized 
and executed by the parities thereto and is valid and in full 
force and effed and is binding upon the plaintiff". 
c) Finding No. 14 (R. 93) by the Court below states 
that "plaintiff was at all times aware of the Pipeline and 
Water Rental Agreement and the Water Exchange Agree-
ments involved herein. He consented thereto, made no ob-
jections thereto and benefited therefrom. * * * Said 
Pipeline and Water Rental Agreement and Water Exchange 
Agreements are valid and in full force and effect and are 
binding upon the plaintiff." (Emphasis added.) 
Upon these findings, the Court properly concluded (R. 
94) : 
a) "That plaintiff consented to the water exchange 
agreements in this action." 
b) "That the Pipeline 1and Water Rental Agreement 
and the Water Exchange Agreements herein are 
valid and in full force and effect and are binding 
upon plaintiff." 
Ini,tially, we respectfully submit that these specific 
findings of fact 'and conclusions of law have not been at-
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tacked directly in Appelliant's Brief. Instead, he has chosen 
to wholly ignore them. The rule which is applicable here 
was set forth by this Court in Burton v. Zions Cooperative 
Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P. 2d 514, at page 
366 of the Utah Reports as follows : 
"There is a presumption that the judgment of 
the Trial Court was correct, and every reasonable 
intendment must be fodulged in favor of it; the 
burden of affirmatively showing error is on the 
party complaining thereof." 
Again in In Re Lavell's Estate, Immerthal v. First Se-
curity Bank of Utah, et al., 122 Utah 253, 248 P. 2d 372, 
this Court applied this generally accepted doctrine applic-
able to attacks upon appeal to findings of fact made by the 
Trial Court. There, contrary to the case at bar, the Appel-
lant in his Brief referred specifically to the findings in 
question and discussed them and the evidence sufficiently 
to comply with the rule. However, the Court in that case 
stated the principle which we submit is here applicable. 
The language there is this : 
"An appellant cannot be asked to go through 
the transcript, showing how the testimony reported 
on each page does not support the finding. Yet, in-
sofar as is practicable, he must detail, with citation 
to the record where appropriate, the particulars 
wherein the evidence touching the finding is incon-
sistent therewith or is not of enough moment to 
sustain it" (P. 258). 
We submit that the Appellant here, by ignoring the 
record, by pretending that the findings did not exist, and 
by failing even to discuss them, forfeits any right to raise 
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factual issues. In addition, his failure to mention any evi-
dence upon which they are based, or to point out wherein 
it is insufficient to support the Trial Court's findings 
should require this Court ,to conclude that they are binding 
upon Appellant and sufficient to support the judgment. 
In support of the foregoing conclusions, we believe that 
Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, et al., 121 Utah 359, 242 P. 2d 297 
is apposite. In that case, this Court reiterated this well 
known appellate concept: 
"As to any prejudicial error claimed, none of 
the many rulings on admission of evidence was as-
signed specifically on appeal as constituting preju-
dicial error, so that any decision thereon would re-
quire discussion of all objections, - no one of 
which plaintiff has had an opportunity to meet in 
her brief because of such non-designation. There-
fore, we feel constrained not to review those mat-
ters which plaintiff cannot defend against because 
not ca1led to attention by her opponents" (P. 360). 
See ·also Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 Pac. 
1093 at page 155. 
Also of controlling significance is the language in 
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company V. Salt Lake County, et al., 
60 Utah 491, 210 Pac. 106 where this Court stated: 
"While it is not only permissible but often com-
mendable for counsel to .group their assignments 
and consider kindred subjects together, yet when 
the findings of fact are assa:iled, which, in the na-
ture of things at least, cannot all, nor even a large 
pol'tion thereof, be contrary to the evidence, counsel 
must point out in ivhat particulars the findings are 
not supported by the evidence; and it is not suffi-
25 
cient merely to make the assignments specific, but 
if they are relied on they must be specifically re-
ferred to in the brief, so that we may know what 
points are relied on, and where we may look in the 
record for the evidence or the lack of evidence with 
respect ,thereto" (P. 504; Emphasis added). 
This doctrine was dishonored here by Appellant and 
that should require a summary affirmance of the judgment 
of the Trial Court. 
Assuming arguendo that any issues are raised by Ap-
pellant, the findings made by the Trial Judge are ade-
quately supported by evidence and must stand. In "Relief 
Sought on Appeal" at page 2 of Appellant's Brief, Appel-
lant seeks only reversal of that part of the judgment as 
against Alta refusing to award to him a decree "quieting 
his title" to water of Alta Spring. We submit that this is 
an issue in which legal matters, as contrasted with equita-
ble issues, prevail. This Court so he'ld in Holland v. Wilson, 
et al., 8 U. (2d) 11, 327 P. 2d 250. There, the plaintiff 
sought to quiet equitable title to property, to declare in him 
the righlt of possession, and to grant a restraining order 
against the defendant. In that case, this Court said: 
"We are further of the opinion that although 
histotically an action to quiet title was originally 
equitable and the law courts had no jurisdiction to 
grant such relief, that situation does not prevail in 
this state. Formerly equity courts afforded relief 
because there was no adequate remedy at law. In 
this jurisdiction, however, there is an adequate 
remedy provided by statute under the provisions of 
Chapter 40 of Title 78, USCA 1953" (P. 14). 
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Although not specifically raised under "Relief Sought 
on Appeal", Appellant argues throughout his Brief that 
certain water and water exchange agreements are not bind-
ing upon him and he states thwt this Court should declare 
that those agreements are not binding upon him. Any 
judgment so declaring would fall within the scope of Title 
78, Chapter 33, UCA, 1953. Section 9 thereof states that: 
"When a proceeding under this chapter in-
volves the determination of an issue of fact, such 
issue may be tried and determined in the same 
manner as issues of fact are tried and determined 
in other civil actions in the court in which the pro-
ceeding is pending." 
It follows that the issues involved in this matter relat-
ing to said contracts such as knowledge, consent, benefits, 
dealing with the wrong parties, etc., likewise are mixed 
questions of law and fact and this Court has no power to 
weigh the facts except as to their sufficiency to sustain the 
Trial Court's findings. 
The rule applicable when this Court is asked to review 
findings of fact of a Trial Judge ;sitting without a jury in 
a law case was enunciated 1as early as 1898 in Isaac N. 
Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Uta!h 240, 51 P. 980. There the 
Court stated: 
"It is urged for the Appellant that the evidence 
is insufficient 1Jo justify these findings. This, how-
ever, is a question of fact in a case at law, and 
therefore we have no power 1Jo consider the justness 
of the findings. The only province of this court in 
such a case is to ascertain whether there is any 
legitimate proof which supports them, and, if there 
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is, then we are conclusively bound by them, regard-
less of whether or not the findings are supported by 
a preponderonce of the testimony, or whether, in 
our judgment, on all the evidence, they are justi-
fied" (P. 242). 
This doctrine has been reiterated by this Court in 
numerous subsequent cases. See e.g.: Ogden Packing & 
Provision Co. v. Tooele Meat & Storage Co., 41 Utah 92, 
124 P. 333; Osborn v. Peters, 69 Utah 391, 255 P. 435; 
Scott v. Austin, 47 Utah 248, 1512 P. 1178; Valiotis v. Utah-
Apex Min. Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 P. 802; Western Union 
Tel Co. v. Matthews, et al., 74 Utah 495, 505, 280 P. 729; 
Van Leeuwen v. Huffaker, 78 Utah 521, 528, 5 P. 2d 714; 
Vadner v. Rozzelle, 88 Uta:h 162, 164, 45 P. 2d 561, rehearing 
denied 88 Utah 172, 54 P. 2d 1214; Greco v. Gentile, 88 
Utah 255, 53 P. 2d 1155; Harper v. Tri-State Motors, Inc., 
et al., 90 Utah 212, 222, 58 P. 2d 18, rehearing denied 90 
Utah 226, 63 P. 2d 1056. 
In this case we can, without admitting that the record 
so shows, make one further assumption and that is that 
equitable issues predominated. Even with tlhat assumption 
as a premise, the findings of the Courit below must still be 
sustained. The rule applicable under such an assumed sit-
uation is set forth in this language found in Sidney Stevens 
Implement Co. v. South Ogden Land, Building & Improve-
ment Co., et al., 20 Utah 267, 58 P. 843: 
"All of the testimony touching this finding, 
consists of oral statements of witnesses and was 
conflicting. In such instances, the Trial Judge hav-
ing the witnesses before him can observe their de-
portment upon rthe stand, and is therefore in a bet-
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ter position to judge their credibility and the weight 
of the evidence, than are the judges of the Appel-
l1ate Court. For this reason, although the Supreme 
Court 'has power, under Sec. 9, Art. 8 of the 
Constitution to review facts in an equity case,' 
(McKay v. Farr, 15 Utah 261) stil'l, unless the evi-
dence is clearly insufficient to sustain the findings, 
they will not be disturbed by the Appellarte Court" 
(P. 280; Emphasis added). 
See Accord: Escamilla v. Pingree, et al., 44 Utah 421, 141 
P. 103, L.R.A. 1915 B, 475; Beesley v. Boardman, 50 Utah 
149, 166 P. 991. 
As the next step under the two foregoing assumptions, 
we now turn to a review of the evidence upon which these 
unchallenged findings are based. Although Appellant stated 
on direct examinaJtion that he had no notice of shareholder 
meetings regarding the water agreements and that he had 
not consented thereto, he was forced, on cross examination, 
to correct that testimony. Appel'lant admitted that as early 
as 1956, immediately after the signing of the first ·water 
Exchange Agreement, he was aware of the agreement (Tr. 
86-7). Moreover, he admitted thaJt on June 14, 1956, and 
prior to the approval of that agreement, he personally 
signed Exhibit 16 (Tr. 88). Exhibit 16 is "Waiver of No· 
tice of Special Meeting of Stockholders 1of Alta Ditch & 
Oanal Company" which provided (See Ex. 16) : 
"And we do hereby waive all requirements of 
the statutes of the State of Utah and the Articles 
of Incorporation of Alta Ditch & Canal Company, 
both as to the notice of this meeting, and the pur-
pose thereof, and consent to the transaction of any 
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and all business that may come before the meeting, 
including the following matters: 
"* * * 
" ( 3) For the purpose of taking all necessary 
further action in connection with the pending pipe-
line loan of this company with Utah Water & Power 
Board; and 
" ( 4) To transact any and all other business 
which may come before the meeting." 
He further testified that on March 10, 1966 he person-
ally signed "Waiver and Notice of Annual Stockholders 
Meeting" (Tr. 89) which provided in part (See Ex. 17): 
"We further consent and agree that in addition 
to the elections and the regular business to come 
before said annual stockholders meeting that the 
matter of the pipeline and water rental agreement 
between the Metropolitan Water District of Orem 
City, on the one hand, and Alta Ditch & Canal Com-
pany on the other, may also be considered, acted 
upon and concluded a:t said meeting; and also all 
matters pertaining to the pipeline contract with the 
state." 
Appellant's only attempt to explain away his signing of 'the 
Waiver was as follows (Tr. 89) : 
"A. I didn't understand it that way or I would 
never have signed iit. 
"Q. But you did sign it, sir? 
"A. I did sign it." 
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Hence, it is uncontroverted that exhibits 16 and 17 
were presented to and signed by the AppeUant prior to the 
meetings at which 'the pipeline construction agreement and 
the initial Water Exchange Agreement were acted upon 
and approved by Alta. We submit that this evidence alone 
is sufficient to support the findings of the Courit below. 
In addition to the foregoing admissions, Appellant tes-
tified that he affirma:tively asserted his rights as a share-
holder of Alta, including a demand to examine the minutes 
of the meetings of the shareholders and of the Board of 
Directors (Tr. 106). As a stockholder, he received either 
dividends or assessments in each year (Tr. 116-7). Ap-
pellant knew that .A:lta was getting revenue from the Water 
Exchange Agreements with Orem City (Tr. 116-7). In 
dividend years during ,the time of the Water Exchange 
Agreements, operating expenses were paid first from the 
revenue before the dividends were voted (Tr. 311). In divi-
dend years, Appellant did not contribute to the operating 
expenses of rthe Company, but instead permitted these rev-
enue funds to be used in defraying corporate expenses 
which otherwise would have required assessments (Tr. 
117). Appellan't admitted that he had notice of the share-
holders meetings which were held over the years. His only 
justification in not participating more actively was that 
"I didn't go to all of them" (Tr. 120). Although Appellant 
claimed he did not :attend all of the meetings, his activity 
in this regard is illustr:ated by Exhibit 18, minutes of stock-
holders meeting dated March 21, 1962 which recite: "A 
Motion to re-elect the officers as now constituted was made 
by Dean Gillman and seconded by Dean Park". 
31 
Appellant further stated that as early as 1956, he at-
tended a meeting after he admittedly "knew they had sold" 
his water and he "wanted to find out about it" (Tr. 87). 
Notices of all meetings of the shareholders of Alta Ditch & 
Canal Company involving all of the issues here before the 
court were mailed to all shareholders, including Park (Tr. 
304). Those notices were personally prepared and mailed 
by Vivian P. Hales, who appeared and testified at the trial 
(Tr. 304). She personally has attended every meeting of 
Alta Ditch & Canal Company since 1922 with the exception 
of one where the minutes of the meeting were kept by the 
wife of one of the other shareholders (Tr. 306). At such 
shareholder meetings, of which AppeUant was given due 
notice, the business of the corporation was transaclej, in-
cluding the business relating to the Water Exchange Agree-
ments, the monies received therefrom and their application 
either for payment of expenses or distribution as dividends 
(Tr. 308-9). Mrs. Hales further testified that to her per-
sonal knowledge Appellant had been treated precisely as 
was every other shareholder of Alta and had been given 
notice, as were all other shareholders, of the meetings at 
which the corporate business was authorized and transacted 
(Tr. 310-12). 
In short, the evidence is both overwhelming and un-
con troverted that from the time Appellant became a share-
holder of Alta Ditch & Canal Company, he was aware of 
its corporate action and he expressly consented to the water 
and Water Exchange Agreements which he now, at this 
late date seeks to attack. This being true, the various 
' 
32 
arguments contained under Points 1, 2 and 3 of his Brief 
:fall far back of merit. 
POINT III. 
APPELLANT RATIFIED THE VARIOUS 
WATER EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS AND IS 
BOUND BY THE PROVISIONS THEREOF. 
The evidence showing that Appellant was fully aware 
of the water, water rights and Water Exchange Agree-
ments is outlined above. The various agreements benefited 
Appellant directly. The very Water Exchange Agreements 
which he now seeks to destroy made it possible for him to 
obtain, through claimed agreement with Orem City, the 
"continuous flow" which he desired (Tr. 122). He speci-
fically admitted that the various agreements worked to 
his advantage and that he benefited thereby (Tr. 129-30). 
Under these admitted facts, the Court's specific find-
ing that Appellant "made no objections" to the various 
agreements and "benefited therefrom" (See Finding No. 
14, R. 93) is not only supported by evidence by any con-
ceivable test, but any other finding would have been fact-
ually and legally improper. 
The legal effect of the course of action followed by 
Appellant is enunciated by Fletcher Cyclopedia Corpora-
tions, Vol. 13, Chapter 58, Sec. 5862 as follows: 
"A stockholder who, with knowledge of the 
facts, himself has given his consent to, or acquiesced 
in, acts of the directors or other corporate officers, 
or of majority stockholders, cannot ordinarily at-
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tack such aets afterwards and this applies equally 
well to ultra vires acts. * * * So a stockholder 
cannot attack a wrongful or ultra vires act, where he 
has accepted pecuniary benefits thereunder with 
knowledge of the facts. * * * It is immaterial 
whether the conduct relied on be considered an es-
toppel, ratification, election or the assumption of a 
position inconsistent with an attack." 
Here, pretermitting consent, Appellant admittedly ac-
cepted pecuniary benefits from the very corporate action 
which he here seeks to escape. By accepting the enrich-
ment, he ratified the corporate acts and is bound by them. 
Again, this makes all of the arguments set forth under 
Points 1, 2 and 3 of Appellant's Brief irrelevant to the 
issues herein involved. 
POINT IV. 
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT AP-
PELLANT NEITHER CONSENTED TO NOR 
RATIFIED THE VARIOUS WATER AGREE-
MENTS, HE IS, NONETHELESS, BOUND BY 
THE PROVISIONS THEREOF. 
This point is argued because the principles involved 
require that the judgment be affirmed regardless of 
whether Appellant had consented rto or ratified the agree-
ments involved. This for the reason that the agreements 
are still binding upon him. In the pleadings, Appellant 
both affirmatively alleges and admits that Alta is a cor-
poration of the State of Utah (R. 3, 34). It is, therefore, 
necessary to examine the statutes of the State of Utah to 
determine whether or not a corporation has the legal power 
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to exchange its water without the consent of every share-
holder. 
The Articles of Incorporation of Alta (See Ex. 7) 
were fi'led with the Secretary of State of Utah on Novem-
ber 26, 1946. They do not state express1ly whether the cor-
poration created thereby is a corporation for pecuniary 
profit or a non-profit corporation. We will, therefore, ex-
amine the statutes applying to both types of corporations. 
The statutes in effect at the time of incorporation are 
of special significance because in Fower, et al. vs. Provo 
Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., et al., 99 Utah 267, 101 P. 
2d 375, this Court stated: 
"It is well settled that the Articles of Incorpo-
ration of a corporation form the basis of a contract 
among others, between the corporation anj its 
stockholders. lit is also well settled that 'the provi-
sions contained in the Constitution and Statutes are 
as rnuch a part of the Articles of Incorporation as 
though they were expressly copied therein'." (P. 
270; Emphasis added.) 
The 1applicable Non-Profit Corporation Statute in force 
at the date of incorporation and at the date of the Agree-
ments here involved stated in pertinenrt part that "unless 
otherwise provided in the Articles of Incorporation or By-
Laws, upon consent of two-thirds of the members of the 
corporation present at a meeting duly called and held", the 
corporation may "mortgage, encumber, lease, sell or convey 
any real or personal property of the corporation. * * *" 
(16-6-9, U.C.A. 1953 - Repealed by Laws of 1963, Ch. 17, 
Sec. 93). Appellant claims no procedural defect, admits 
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notice of meetings and does not claim that any other share-
holder lacked knowledge or failed to consent to the con-
tracts involved. It follows that ithe statute quoted granted 
to the corporation the right to enter into a W1ater Exchange 
Agreement upon consent of two-<thirds of the shar~holders. 
The same result would follow if the present non-profit cor-
poration statute were applied. See Title 16, Chapter 6, 
Sections 20 and 61, U. C. A. 1953, as amended in 1963. 
This Court in the recent case of Gunnison-Fayette Canal 
Company vs. Gunnison Irrigation Company, 448 P. 2d 707, 
stated that: 
"The Nonprofit Corporation Act found in Sec. 
16-6-20, U. C. A. 1953 (Repliacement Vol. 2, 1967 
Pocket Supplement), applies to mutual irrigation, 
canal, ditch, reservoir and water companies." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The present act specifiml1y applies to "mutual >irrigation, 
canal, ditch, reservoir and water companies and water 
users' associations organized and existing under the laws 
of this State on the effective date of this Act. See 16-6-20, 
U. C. A. 1953. The Act took effect on July 1, 1963, before 
the 1964 ditch improvement contract and the 1966 Water 
Exchange Agreement which are discussed above and which 
Appellant, through this appeal, seeks to destroy. 
Similarly, if it were to be contended that Alta is a 
corporation for pecuniary profit, the applicable statutes 
confer upon it the r,ight to dispose of either real or personal 
properiy without the consent of all stockholders. Title 18, 
Chapter 2, Sec. 16, U. C. A. 1953, in effect ,at the date of 
incorporation of Alta and the current statute as contained 
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in Title 16, Chapter 10, Sec. 4, U. C. A. 1953, as amended 
in 1961, also authorizes such a conveyance. 
In argument under Point 2, Appellant cites, quotes 
from and discusses at length numerous cases, all of which 
are interesting, but none of which has any application to 
his position in this case.* None of this authority decided 
whether or not a mutual water company has the legal power 
to exchange certain water for a greater volume of water 
from another source with the consent of more than two-
thirds, but not all of the outstanding stock. However, in a 
case not cited by Appellant, this Court laid to rest that 
particular issue. In Beggs, et al. vs. Myton Canal & Irr. 
Co., et al., 54 Utah 120, 179 Pac. 984, the Court was con-
sidering the powers and privileges of a mutual irrigation 
company. There, minority stockholders (with proportion-
ate interests much greater than Appellant here) filed an 
action to annul an agreement through which the irrigation 
company disposed of all of its water rights and other prop-
erty asserting that the contract was void and ultra vires 
and that "the corporation had no power to sell or dispose 
of its property" without the consent of all of its sharehold-
ers, precisely the position here asserted by Appellant. 
Hence, the doctrine of Beggs is here controlling. The Beggs 
case was even stronger on behalf of the plaintiff than is the 
case at bar in that the former involved an outright sale of 
all water and water rights and all other property of the 
"mutual irrigation company". On the contrary, the case 
at bar involves only lease and exchange agreements through 
*A brief discussion distinguishing these cases is set forth in Appendix 
II. 
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which shareholders of Alta received a greater amount of 
water, together with a payment of cash, whieh admittedly 
were of cons~derable benefit to all shareholders, including 
Appellant. 
In disposing of the Plaintiff's contention in Beggs, 
this Court stated: 
"In our opinion, counsel's argument is not ten-
able. * * * Considering the section as a whole, 
the manifest legislative intent is that all corpora-
tions in this state may, through their directors and 
upon confirmation by a vote of a majority in 
amount of outstanding stock, dispose of the corpor-
ate property when such disposition is not provided 
for in the Articles of Incorpomtion. And when the 
Articles of Incorporation provide that the property 
of th1e corporation may be sold by the directors or 
by the shareholders sales made in accordance with 
such provisions will be binding UP'On the corpo:m-
tion. Whether such corporation be organized for 
mining purposes, or for other purposes, under the 
general incorporation laws of the state, our statute 
gives private corporations the power to sell and 
dispose of their property upon confirmation by a 
majority in the amount of the outstanding stock. 
No further authority need be invoked in this case." 
(Emphasis added.) 
We respectfully submit that, as this Court said in 
Beggs, no further authority need be invoked to support the 
Trial Court's judgment in this case. Most assuredly, Ap-
pellant, with approximately one percent of the stock of 
Alta, does not have a veto power over the action of the 
corporiation approved by all other stockholders and for the 
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mutual benefit of the corporation and all of its stockhold-
ers. 
POINT V. 
APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT TO USE ALTA 
DITCH WATER BASED UPON AN INTER-
EST IN STOCK OF OLD ALTA. 
The claim asserted in the Brief that Appellant has an 
interest to use Alta water based upon ,an interest in stock 
of Old Alta is contrary to his theory as set out in 'the plead-
ings before the Court below. In his Reply to Counterclaim 
(R. 34), Appellant admitted that "his rights to use the 
water of Alta Springs are limited to his rights as a share-
holder of Alta Ditch & Canal Company". 
However, moving to the merits of this claim, the rec-
ord clearly demonstrates that this admission was compelled 
by the facts involved and by 'the prior holdings of the Dis-
tric Court in Civil No. 15,460 which is discussed in detail 
above. As is set forth above in the statement of facts and 
in Appendix I, the Court in the prior case held that the 
shareholders of the old defunct corporation did not become 
tenants in common to the underlying assets of the old cor-
pomtion, including the water rights, that they were not 
necessary parties in that action, that all of the rights of 
the shareholders of the old defunct corporation had been 
conveyed to the new corporation, that the new corporation 
held the equitable interests in the underlying property and 
that the technical legal title stood in the old corporation. 
It further held that the only remedy of equitable owners 
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against the old corporation was through mandamus to com-
pel the directors of the old corporation to convey technical 
legal title to the new corpomtion. 
Interestingly, Appellant was ,a party to that proceed-
ing and was one of the Director-Trustees holding legal title 
with a duty to convey the same to the new corporation. 
(Ex. 3, Vol. 2, Stipulation; quoted iin pertinent part in Ap-
pendix I). Appellant admitted at trial that he had signed 
the Stipulation for amendment of :the judgment "Individu-
ally and as Director-Trustees of Alta Ditch & Canal Com-
pany, a defunct corporation". (See Ex. 3, Vol. 2, Stipula-
tion, Tr.117-8). 
In asserting this claim, Appellant therefore finds him-
self in a wholly untenable position. He seeks, contrary to 
law, to attack collaterally the judgment in case No. 15,460 
by which he is bound. He was a Director-Trustee of the old 
corpomtion and was thus under the specific order of 'the 
Court to convey legal title to Alta Ditch & Canal Company 
and to Orem City, the equitable owners thereof. He, to-
gether with fellow Director-Trustees, failed to comply With 
the mandatory order of the Court. Hence, any interest 
which he contends he retained in the old defunct corpora-
tion must find its roots in his contempt of Court in failing 
or refusing to obey its affirmative order to convey away 
the interest involved. We submit that AppeHant cannot be 
permitted to benefit from his contemptuous conduct. Such 
a result would be unthinkable on the grounds asserted. 
Furthermore, when consideration is .given to the supporting 
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doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by judgment, a hold-
ing to that effect would be tragically unjust. 
POINT VI. 
APPELLANT HAS BEEN AFFORDED ALL 
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES TO WHICH HE 
IS ENTITLED AS A SHAREHOLDER OF 
ALTA. 
The record in this matter contains no evidence that 
Appellant was deprived of any right or privilege afforded 
to other srtockholders of Al'ta. He admitted that he had 
been tendered dividends over the years as had other share-
holders (Tr. 95-6). He was never refused his proper water 
turn represented by his shares of stock (Tr. 98-9). He 
made no unsatisfied request of Alta with respect to his 
connection to and use of water supplied by Orem City (Tr. 
101-2). He received either dividends or assessments each 
year as did other shareholders (Tr. 116-7). No request for 
change in point of diversion has been denied (Tr. 128). He 
received notices of the various shareholders meetings over 
the years (Tr. 120). 
Appellant seeks to found some rights on the fact thart 
during a portion of the time here involved he returned 
dividends which had been mailed to him. However, the 
minutes of the stockholders meeting of March 21, 1962 
(Ex. 18) , place this matter in proper perspective. They 
read: 
"A motion to take under advisement about 
keeping the dividend of Dean Park rather than pay 
41 
it to him. Mr. Park asked us as a favor to keep 
whatever dividend payable to him in the Alta trea-
sury." 
Certainly he cannot parlay Alta's compliance with this 
request into affirmative rights on his part. 
From Appelliant's tes1timony, it is perfectly obvious 
that he has been afforded every right and privilege to 
which he was entitled as a shareholder of Alta Ditch & 
Canal Company. His testimonial admissions are consistent 
with the affirmative testimony of the Secretary of the 
Company, Mrs. Hales (See Tr. 303-11). From this record, 
it is apparent why the Court below concluded (Conclusions 
of Law No. 8, R. 94): 
"That plaintiff has been afforded all rigihts and 
privileges to which he is entitled as a shareholder 
of defendant Alta Ditch & Canal Company." 
Appellant on this appeal has not in his Brief chal-
lenged the validity of this conclusion. It is inescapable 
from the evidence in the record and must stand. 
POINT VII. 
ALTA HAS NOT INTERFERED WITH OR 
THREATENED TO INTERFERE WITH AP-
PELLANT'S WATER SUPPLY AND NO ES-
TOPPEL CAN ARISE AGAINST ALTA ON 
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE. 
Under Point 4 of his Brief commencing at page 25, 
Appellant argues that Alta "fa estopped from interfering 
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with AppeUant's water supply". Tihis argument is as 
stra:ined as it is foreign to the record in this matter. There 
is no evidence in the record of any interference by Alta or 
any threat of such interference with Appellant's water sup-
ply. The record condusively demonstrates that it has noth-
ing whatsoever to do with his water supply. As is set forth 
above in detail, witli appropriate references to the record, 
Appe1lant's water supply has been taken from the 14 inch 
culinary line of Orem City. Alta has no interest 1in or con-
trol over the use or distribution of water from the Orem 
culinary water line. 
At page 5 of Appellant's Briief, the statement is made 
that "from 1949 to the date of filing this suit the Appellant 
diverted his share of Alta Spring water through the Orem 
City pipeline to his system constructed at an expense ex-
ceeding $24,000.00." This statement is not a fair summary 
of the evidence on this subject. On cross examination, Ap-
pellant admitted that "much of the expense" was "not in-
volved with the installation of the pipeline, but the creation 
of a spvinkling system and water works sys,tem beyond the 
end of the pipe". He further admitted that a substantial, 
but undesignated, portion of such system could not reason-
ably be claimed against any defendant in the law suit (Tr. 
103-4). In any event, the cost 'of the diversionary system 
is wholly irrelevant as fo Alta because it was never advised 
about nor is it charged with 1such costs. 
But in addition, Appellant admitted on cross examina-
tion that he did not advise any representative of Alta how 
much the diversionary works cost or who he expected to 
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pay for the costs whatever they be. He also admitted that 
his connection was with the Orem City line, not the Alta 
water system and that he did not advise Alta or its repre-
sentatives that he intended to take the water from the 
Orem City pipeline without paying for itt (Tr. 133-5). 
These admiss1ions are corroborated by the testimony of 
Alta's President, James Ferguson, called as a witness for 
Appellant, who stated that the connection was made to the 
line of Orem City; that the subject of costs was never dis-
cussed; that no daim was asserted agaJinst Alta; and that 
all substantial actions of Alta were reflected in its minutes 
and no claim by Appellant against Alta is shown therein 
(Tr. 175-7). 
From this evidence obtained through Appellant him-
self and through Alta's President called as 1hiis witness, the 
court below found ( R. 93) : 
"The evidence does not contain facts from 
which findings could be made to support plaintiff's 
claim of estoppel as against defendant Alta Ditch 
& Canal Company, Metropolitan Water District of 
Orem and Orem City, and the court finds for said 
defendants and against the plaintiff on plaintiff's 
claims of estoppel." 
From these findings, the court concluded (R. 94) : 
"That the alleged estoppel claimed by the plain-
tiff does not run against defendants Alta Ditch & 
Canal Company, Metropolitan Water District of 
Orem and Orem City, or any of 'them." 
Again, Appellant does not specifically cltallenge this 
finding of the Court. We submit, under the authorities 
stated above, that he is bound thereby. 
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The estoppel claim, under the record in this case, is so 
far-fertched that we assume that it must have been here 
asserted in despair. No other reason is apparent. The 
only Utah case cited in Appellant's Brief on this subject is 
Mary Jane Stevens Co. vs. First National Building Co., 89 
Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099. There, the court specifically re-
fused to apply "estoppel", starting: "It usually requires 
some affirmative act of silence where there is a duty to 
speak to raise an estoppel". The court there cited with 
approval and relied upon the teachings of the following 
cases: 
a) Finch, et al. vs. Theiss, 107 N. E. 898. There the 
Supreme Court of Illinois said : 
"There was no element of fraud on the part of 
appellant. 'There must be deception and change of 
conduct in consequence, in order to estop a party 
from showing the truth.' Davidson vs. Young, 38 
Ill. 145. In Mullaney vs. Duffy, 145 Ill. 559, 33 N. 
E. 750, it was said, where it is sought to establish 
an estoppel from the silence of a party who in 
equity and good conscience sh1ould have spoken, it 
is essential that the parity sought to be estopped 
should have had knowledge of the facts, and the 
1other party have been ignorant of the truth, and 
h'ave been misled into doing that which he would 
not have done but for such silence." 
b) Bright, et al. vs. Allen, 203 Pa. 394, 53 A. 251. 
There the Court stwted the rule as follows : 
"We can see no evidence of any act upon the 
part of plaintiffs to encourage defendant to build 
on this portion of the wall. The doctrine of 'the 
cases cited does not sustain the conclusion reached. 
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Thus in Hill vs. Epley, 31 Pa. 331, it appears plainly 
that the doctriine of estoppel can only arise where 
the conduct of a party has been such as to induce 
action by another; that the par:ty setting up the es-
toppel must have acted on the faith of such conduct; 
that he must have been positively encouraged to act, 
or that he must lrave had a mistaken opinion re-
specting his title; and that the party to be estopped 
must have been aware of this mistake, and if he 
had not such knowledge Ms silence does not estop 
him." (Emphasi,s :added.) 
In Wellsville East Field Irr. Co., et al. vs. Lindsay 
Land & Livestock Co., et al., 104 Utah 448, 137 P. 2d 634, 
the Utah Supreme Court described the doctrine of estoppel 
as applied to interests in water rights and water distribu-
tion systems. It saJid : 
"The defense of esiJoppel must fail because 
facts setting up an estoppel have not been proved. 
There is no showing of fraud, deceit, or reliance on 
the conduct of the plaintiff to the detriment of the 
defendants, etc., as required to make out estoppel. 
" 'The elements requisite for estoppel are sub-
stantially those necessary to found an 1action for 
deceit, with the exception of the element of knowl-
edge of falsi'ty.' Weil, Water Rights in Western 
States, § 593. Weil further points out in § 594 
that 'Estoppel may :a:riise where the necessary facts 
are present. But the daim is usually based on sil-
ence, standing by, and similar omission to act while 
another is incurring expense in arranging hostile 
plans'" (Emphasis added). 
Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law of Water in 
the West, has this to say : 
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"An estoppel involves turpitude, fraud - such 
as misleading statements or acts, or concealment of 
facts by •.silence - with the result that one party is 
induced or ·led by the words, conduct or silence of 
another party to do things that he otherwise would 
not have done. The intent to deceive muslt have ex-
isted, or rut least there must have been an imputa-
tion that the party against whom an esltoppel is 
claimed expeoted the other party to act. Unless 
there is some degree of turpitude, a court of equity 
will not estop one from asserting his title where the 
effect is to for/ eit his property and trans/ er its en-
ioyment to another." (P. 402; Emphasis added.) 
Nio such facts exist in the case here on review. There 
certainly is no evidence of fraud or deceit on rthe part of 
Alta or any of its representatives. Admittedly, they did 
not encourage the Appellant to enter into his claimed 
agreement with Orem Ci'ty to construct his pipeline or to 
tap or use Orem City water. Appellant at 'the trial did not 
even claim any act or omissi1on of Alta upon which he re-
lied, to his detriment, or otherwise. In short, none of the 
several elements of estoppel are present here as against 
Alta and the specific and unchallenged findings and conclu-
sions of the court below should not be disturbed. 
POINT VIII. 
IN ANY EVENT, APPELLANT IS NOT EN-
TITLED TO A "QUIET TITLE" DECREE BE-
CAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF A NECESSARY 
PARTY. 
The only issue raised by Appellant as against Alta in 
his Brief under designation "Relief Sought on Appeal" is 
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to reverse that part of the judgment of the Trial Court 
denying him a decree quieting his title to water of Alta 
Spring. 
Since Appellant apparently seeks to have this Court 
quiet title to the water, water rights and facilities involved, 
it is pertinent to note that this remedy is impossible by 
reason of his failure to join an indispensable party - the 
State of Utah which holds l1egal title to the use of water, 
water rights and diversl:ion facilities involved. The con-
struction loan agreement discussed above (see Ex. 31) 
conveys title to all of ,such property rto the State of Utah. 
On the last page thereof is a certificate of James B. Fer-
guson and Eugene Crandall that the same was signed by 
Alta by authority of a resolution of its sitockholders and 
that the corporation duly had executed the same. Exhibit 
16, admittedly bearing the signature of Appellant (Tr. 88) 
is a Waiver of Notice of Special Meeting of Stockholders 
of Alta called for the specific purpose, among other things, 
of taking "all necessary action in connection with the pend-
ing pipeline loan of this company with Utah Water & 
Power Board". Hence, the uncontroverted evidence estab-
lishes that Appellant consented to the transfer of all of the 
water and water rights of Alta to tile State of Utah. It 
follows that the State of Utah is a necessary party if the 
Appellant seriously seeks to quiet title to the property 
rights involved. 
Rule 19 of the Ufah Rules of Civil Procedure titled 
"Necessary J oinder of Parties" reads in pertinent part: 
"(a) NECESSARY JOINDER. Subject to 
the provisions of Rule 23 (Class Actions) and of 
subdivision (b) of this Rule (J·ainder of Parties not 
Indispensable) , Persons having a joint interest shall 
be made parties and be joined on the same side as 
plaintiffs or defendants." 
In commenting on Rule 19 (a) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure which is similar to the Utah Rule, Pro-
fiessor Moore in his Treatise on Federal Practice, Vol. 3, 
2nd Edition, page 2145 contrasts permissive joinder with 
the compulsory joinder required by Rule 19 with the fol-
lowing language : 
"Rule 19, on the other hand, deals with com-
pulsory joinder of parties - parties whose presence 
before the court is conditionally necessary or indis-
pensable. Indispensable parties must, in every case, 
be before the court." 
On page 2209, Professor Moore continues: 
"But the concept of indispensability goes be-
yond Federal jurisdict~on and touches the very 
power or right of the court to make ·an equitable 
adjudication, where an indispensable party is not 
before it." 
Professor Moore then explains that the defense of 
failure to join an indispensable party may be made by re-
sponsive pleading or wt the trial. Indeed, the matter is of 
sufficient significance to permit its raising for the first 
time on appeal. Professor MOlore states at pages 2211-2: 
"And the matter is so vital that an Appell'ate 
Courit, Sua Sponte if necessary, may consider it al-
though the point was not raised in the trial court." 
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With respect to actions to "quiet !title", Professor 
Moore states that "all persons interested in title who will 
be directly affected by the Decree are indispensable par-
ties" (Page 2312, 2314). 
Certainly, under the uncontroverted facts in this rec-
ord, the State of Utah has an interest in the title to the 
water and water rights involved and would be directly 
affected by a decree quieting title to the same in Appellant. 
Therefore, in any event, the relief sought through this Ap-
peal cannot be awarded to Appellant because of the absence 
of an indispensable party. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit as follows : 
1. Appellant's rig1h'ts in this proceeding, if any, run 
against Orem City or Metropolitan Water District of Orem, 
not against Alta Ditch & Canal Company. Appellant's only 
right as against A1lta is as the owner of 'two shares of capi-
tal stock. Appellant has been afforded all rights and privi-
leges to which he is entitled as a shareholder of A1lta. 
2. Appellant consented to and ratified the water '1ease 
and exchange agreements involved and is bound by the 
provisions thereof. 
3. Pretermitting Appellant's consent and ratification, 
Alta had the leg1al power tD enter into such agreements 
without the consent of the Appellant and Appellant is 
bound by the terms thereby. 
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4. Alta has neither interfered with nor threatened 
to interfere with the use of water or water conveyance 
facilities by AppeUant and certain'ly no esfuppel arises 
against Alta on the record in th'is case. 
5. The relief sought through this action and appeal 
cannot be granted because of Appellant's failure to join an 
indispensable party. 
6. Appellant has waived his right on this appeal to 
raise any factual insufficiency to support the Findings of 
Faot by the Trial Judge. 
7. The Findings of Faot duly entered by the court 
below are supported by oompetent, relevant and sufficient 
evidence and the conclusions of law and judgment entered 
thereon are in all respects appropriate and proper. 
8. The judgment appealed from must be affirmed. 
Dated this 27th day of February, 1969. 
GEORGE W. LATIMER and 
KEITH E. TAYLOR 
of and for 
PARSONS, BERLE, EV ANS 
& LATIMER 
520 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent, 
Alta Ditch & Canal Company 
APPENDIX I. 
In ,the handling of Civil No. 15,460, the Trial Court 
determined thaJt primarily legial questions were involved, 
as contrasted with factual disputes, and consequently it 
entered 'its "Memorandum Decision" prior Ito the trial on 
September 10, 1949. The following rulings contained in 
that Memorandum Decision are pertinent here: (See Ex. 
3, Vol. I, Memorandum Decision.) 
1) At page 3, the Court enunciated the position of 
olJ Alta Ditch & Canal Company and its shareholders as 
follows: 
"The defendants oontend that there was no 
need to liquidaJte the old corporation or wind up its 
affairs, because upon the legal d~ath of the old cor-
poration, the legal title automatically went to the 
holders of srtock and ·Since .that time all debits have 
been fully paid without winding up." 
2) In disagreeing with the ~egal conclusions of the 
defendants, the Court stateJ at pages 6 and 7 : 
"Thus while it appears that the exact quesition 
here presented has never been before our Supreme 
Court, this court is convinced that the effect of the 
statute is to prolong the iife of the corporation with 
all of its ownerships, duties and obligations, limited 
only by the duty of its officers and directors to 
'wind it up' and the powers incident thereto. Cer-
tainly such a conclusion presents a clear cut picture 
of rights rand duties without fiction or hypothesis. 
Under it, the corporation cannot engage in corpor-
ate business beyond that essential to wind up the 
affairs. It has aJt hand the same title to all real and 
personal property that irt had at its expiration in 
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order 1Jo expedite its winding up. It has the power 
after payment of a'l'l of its ju.sit obligaJtions and hus-
banding of a:ll of its assets to dispose of such assets 
by sale, if that is for the best inrtereslt of the stock-
holders, and distribrution of the net proceeds, of un-
der the authority of the 'otherwise' provision of the 
statute, it may distribute the ,asselts in kind. The 
duty to wind up is clear in ithe statute. The remedy 
of creditors is provided in suit agaln:st the corpora-
tion. Remedy to stockholders is by mandamus to 
compel the Board of Directors to per/ orm its legal 
duty. (104-68-2 U. C. A. 1943) ." (Emphasis 
added). 
The Court then conltinued at page 7 : 
"The court concludes and holds ·that there was 
a legal duty upon the old corporiaJtion :to wind up 
and that thaJt dutty still exists, and that so long as 
1Jhat duty has not been discharged, the old corpora-
tion is still the legal owner of all of the assets held 
by it ait the date of the expira-tion of its charter ex-
cept those which have been employed in l1iquidaJting 
its obligations or oitherwise used reasonably in the 
course of winding up, or which have been lost by 
virtue of ·some proviisfons of law. It follows that the 
individual water users are not the real parties in 
interest because title to the property in question 
still rests in the old corporation subject Ito winding 
up its affairs which winding up includes conveyance 
by it of its remaining assets after payment of a:H 
Gbligatbions." (EmphaJsis added). 
Hence, the Court specificamy heid that the legal tivle 
to the water, waiter rigihts and water system 'invoilved was 
in the old corporiation, and ndt in its shareho~ders. Further-
more, lits shareholders, tthe individual water users, were not 
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the real parties in interest and were not neces:sary parties 
tJo the action. As stated by :the Court, tthe "remedy to stock-
holders is by mandamus to compel the Board of Directors 
to perform its legal duty." 
The Court itfuen oonJtinued at pages 7 and 8 as follows: 
"So concluding, it must follow thaJt contained 
within the duty of the (Yid corporattion to wind up 
its affairs, and for such purpose to hold, control and 
preserve the asselts is its power and authority for 
disitribu!tJion and regulation of the water rights dur-
ing such period of windi:ng up. Such power and 
authority, foe Court holds, are l()nly incidental and 
necessary to the winding up and come within the 
express provisions of rtlhe s:tatute (18-1-2, supra) in 
tJhese terms : 
" 'And exercise a1li other incidenJta:l and neces-
sary powers.' 
"It follows thus that administration of the 
water by the new corporiation has been without au-
thority of l'aw, bu!t not void, because it has been 
acceded to by all of the equitable owners of the title 
and there 'is no one to comp~ain. * * * 
"The foregoing reasoning and holding eff ec-
tively answers issue of law #9 inasmuch as the 
conclusion necessarily excludes any theory of the 
existence of a tenancy in common as to the property 
of the corporation. Title being still in the old cor-
poration for purposes of liquidation, there is no ten-
ancy in common." (Emphasis added). 
It is, therefore, dear thait the argument of Appellant 
thaJt he is entitled to righrbs in A'11t;a Ditch waiter as a tenant 
in common as a stoclclro1der of the o:ld corporattion flies into 
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the face of the express ruling of the Trial Court fo the con-
trary. As will be demonstr:atbed below, Appellant was a 
party Ito that proceeding and he did nat perfect an appea1 
therefrom. Furthermore, the action of the new Alta Ditch 
& Canal Company was not void beciause acquiesced in by 
al'l p1arties. 
3) At page 50, the Court found and concluded as 
follows: 
"Because of the finding and holding that the 
new company has acquired no property in the Alta 
Ditch, its course, its diversions or its water, the 
Court holds thait the new corporation has no inter-
est whatsoever to distribute or regulaJted such wat-
ers beyond that which may be accorded to it by 
common consent of persons interested. This is not 
an enforceable right as against any pe1~son who de-
clines to accept it for the reason that al'l title and 
right to conduct the property for purposes of liqui-
dation remains with the old corporation unrtil it is 
liquidated according to the provisions of the law." 
The Court continued at Page 55: 
"It is further ordered that the individual de-
fendants proceed forthwith to liquidate ,the affairs 
of the old Alta Ditch & Canal Company and to con-
vey to the present equitable owners thereof or to 
their heirs, executors, adminrstmJtors or 1assigns as 
their interesits may appear their propo:ritionate un-
divided interests in all of the property, assets, rights 
iand privileges now owned and possessed by the said 
corporation after payment of all just debts, claims 
and liabilities." 
Hence, even prior to the ,trial of Civil No. 15,460, the 
Court had ordered that the Trustees of 1the old corporati()n 
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forthwith proceed to liquidate the affairs of the old com-
pany and fo convey fo the "equitable owners" thereof or 
their successors in 'interest all of the property, assets, rights 
and privileges owned by the old corporation. 
In its Findings of Fact following the trial, the Court 
in Civil acition No. 15,460 found that James Ferguson was 
the equi.rtable owner of a small continuous flow of water for 
culinary purposes, that Orem City was the equitable owner 
of approximately a 100/288th interest and that the equit-
able title of the balance of the iruterest was in the new cor-
poration. (See Ex. 3, Vol. II, Findings of Fact). In para-
graph 3, the Court found that the legal title to the 188/2'88th 
interest was conveyed to the old corporation in exchange 
for corporate stock. In paragraphs 14 and 46, the Court 
found that all remaining interests of the incorporators 
were conveyed to the new Alta Ditch & Canal Company in 
in 1946. 
Paragraph 14 reads: 
"* * * all of the individual users having or 
claiming any stock in s1aid old corporation or any 
rights in the Alta Di1tch or Springs, except plaintiff 
(Orem City), at the time of s~gning said new Arti-
cles of Incorporation, conveyed and transferred to 
said new oorporation their right, tirtle and interest 
in and to said A'lta water, springs and otller prop-
erty here involved." (Emphasis added). 
Paragraph 46 reads: 
"That prior to the institution of rthis action, all 
of the owners of stock in the defunct Alta Ditch & 
Canal Company, except Plaiintiff (Orem City), and 
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all of the individual users of water from Alta Diitch 
assigned, and transferred, to the Alta Ditch and 
Canal Company (new) aU their right, title and in-
terest in, and to, said waters, together wi1th all prop-
erty of the old corporation." 
Under date of March 27, 1950, the Court entered its 
Judgment and Decree in Civil No. 15,460. In the Judgment 
and Decree, the Court found in pertinent part: (See Ex. 
3., Vol. II, Judgment). 
"2. That on or about the 20th day of May, 
1893, al'l of s 1aid owners of the right to use Alta 
waters, dams, diverting works, ditches and other 
works connected therewith, became the original in-
corporafors of, and duly conveyed and transferred 
all of their and each of their rights to said water 
and property to, the said Alta Ditch & Canal Com-
pany (old), which received and became legal owner 
of said rights and property and that said company 
was the legal owner thereof, together with all of 
their improvements and additions at the time of 
the expiration of its chariter as in the F:indings set 
out in more detail. 
"3. That on May 20, 1943, at the time of the 
expiration of the charter and franchise of the Alta 
Ditch & Cana:l Company, iit became, was, and now 
is, the duty of said corporation, through its Direc-
tor-Trustees, the individual defendants herein, and 
ithe Court hereby orders them, to wind up its af-
fiairs; to pay its ,debts and obligiations, if any, and 
to promptly transfer the title to all of its remaining 
property and rights to the parties entitled thereto, 
including plaintiff, which is entitled to 1001;2 288ths 
of such property and rights. (Emphasis added). 
"* * * 
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"8. That the new Alta Ditch & Canal Com-
pany !has acquired no title in, or rto, the said Alta 
D:iitch or water and has no right to control or liqui-
date said property or rights beyond thalt which may 
be accorded to it by common coil!Sent of the persons 
interested, 1the right to regui1ate and 1administer the 
property for ithe purpose of liquidation remaining 
with tlle old corporation until its winding up in 
acc·ordance with the provisions of this Decree." 
Following entry of Judgment, the Defendants filed a 
motion for new trial whfoh prompted the parties, by way 
of settlement, and to avoid further litigation, to enter into 
a Stipulation to Amend lthe Judgment and Decree on Jan-
uary 19, 19'51. Appellant here 'himself was a party to this 
Stipulation. He admitted at the trial that the original &tip-
ulation bears his signature (Tr. 1'17-8). The Stipulation 
provides in part, amending Paragraph 55 of the original 
Findings of Faeit: (See Ex. 3, Vol. II, Stipulation, pages 
5-6). 
"55. It is understood that the Alta Ditch & 
Canal Company, and its stockholders, and Orem 
City as a tenant in common, sha!ll have 'the right to 
determine when iJt or they should have use for the 
water. It is further understood and agreed that 
when the water is kept in the Alta Ditch for the 
sole use of Orem City and when Orem City uses 
more of the water of Alta Ditch than its propor-
tionate share of water 3:S hereinbefore specified, 
Orem City shall pay the additional costs of main-
taining the Alta Ditch in carrying the excess water 
for Orem City and if 1the .A:lta Ditch shaH break 
during freezing weather on account of conveying 
water to Orem City when 'the Alita Ditch & Canal 
Company and its stockholders have no use for or 
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are not using water, 1any damages that may result 
from such use of the canal 'by Orem City during 
said time shall 'be paid for by Orem City." (Em-
phasis 'added). 
Paragraph 9 of ithe Judgment and Decree was amended 
in pertinent part to read : ' (See Ex. 3, Vol. II, Stipulation, 
pages 9-10) . 
"That Orem City sha:ll pay for the diverting of 
any excess water through the Alta Ditch & Canal 
as provided in U. C. A. 1943, 100-1-9, and provided, 
further, that if Orem City shal11 desire to use the 
Alta Ditch or Canal during freezing weather or 
such other time that the Alta Ditcih & Canal Com-
pany or its stockholders shaU not desire to use the 
same, then and during such time, Orem City sha:ll 
pay the cost of maintaining said canal and any dam-
age that may result from using the same. It is un-
derstood that the Alta Ditch & Canal Company and 
its stockholders shall have the right to determine 
when they shall use the proportion of the water of 
the Alta Ditch & Canal represented by their propor-
tion thereof as heretofore specified in the Findings 
of Fact herein." (Emphasis added). 
Plaintiff signed the Stipulation: "(Individually and 
as Director-Trustees of Alta Ditch & Canarl Company, a 
defunct corporation.) Defendants." (See Ex. 3, Vol. II, 
Stipulation, last page) . 
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APPENDIX II. 
Analysis Showing Inapplicability of Cases Cited 
by Appellant 
1. East River Bottom Water Co. vs. Boyce, et al., 102 
Utah 149, 128 P. 2d 277. 
This case involved the validity of an inadvertent and 
erroneous issue of seven shares of stock by the corporation. 
The case turned upon a finding by the Trial Court that the 
incorporators did not convey to the corporation their re-
spective water rights. The water rights were never severed 
from the land of the incorporators and remained appurten-
ant thereto. Since the corporation was not the owner of the 
water rights, it obviously could not convey them. 
The facts are exactly to the contrary in our case. The 
District Court, both in Civi1 Action No. 15,460 and in the 
case at bar, made findings, binding upon Appellant, thart 
the rights of the water user incorporators had been effec-
tively conveyed to the corporation, and thus severed from 
the land. (See R. 87; Ex. 3, Vol. 2, Findings of Fact, Para-
graphs 3, 14 and 46.) Hence, the holding of this case has 
no bearing whatsoever upon the case at bar. 
2. Continental Nat. Bank of Salt Lake City vs. Min-
ersville Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 73 Utah 243, 273 P. 502. 
This case, like ithe East River Bottom Water Company 
case supra involved an erroneous "over issue" of stock by 
' ' 
the corp'oration and a finding that the stockholders had 
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not conveyed their water rights to the corporation. For 'the 
reasons set out above, it is not here apropos. 
3. Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co. vs. Union Central 
Life Ins. Co., et al., (First Nat. Bank of Logan, et al., In-
terveners), 105 Utah 468, 142 P. 2d 866. 
The long staitement quoted from this case at pages 15 
and 16 of the Appellant's Brief relates to Logan Northern 
Company, which wa:s not a party to that ,action and whose 
Articles were not before the Court. Indeed, the record 
there contained no evidence with respe0t to the intent of 
the incorporators. The statement is mere dicta. In addi-
tion, it lacks substantial weight because of the absence of 
either a finding by the Trial Cou~ or evidence with respect 
to whether or not the underlying water rights had been 
retained by the incorporators, as in the East River Bottom 
Water Co. and Continental Nat. Bank of Salt Lake City 
cases, supra, or whether the same had been conveyed to the 
corporation, as in the c'ase at bar. 
With respect to this dicta stated by Mr. Justice Larsen, 
Chief Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion points up the 
albsence of any findings or eV'idence relating to this matter 
as follows: 
"Mr. Justice Larsen conc1ludes ithat this is an 
Irrigation Company 'in which the waters are held 
as owners in common. I am unable to locate any-
thing in the record Which reveals Whether the water 
is held in common through the corporation or only 
the canal facilities for transferring and applying it 
are mutual or whether it is an ordinary stock com-
pany where the water is conveyed and stock issued 
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for it. * * * The articles of Logan Northern 
are not in the record. I do not think :that this court 
can 1assume from the fact that the parties refer to 
Logan Northern as a mutual water company, that 
it is merely a Trusitee of the water, or that it is a 
eorP'orate water master with no power to buy or 
sell water, or that the stockholders of that company 
are owners in common of the water." 
It should be noted that, in addition to the findings 
cited above under paragraph 1 of this Appendix to the 
effect that the shareholders in the case at bar did in fact 
convey their water rights to lthe corporation, the Court be-
low in case No. 15,460 specifica1ly found that the water 
users were not tenants in common of the water and water 
rights involved. After having staJted in its Memorandum 
Decision specifically that "it follows that the individua'l 
water users are not the real parties in interest because title 
to the property in question still rests in the old corporation 
* * *" the Trial Court in the prior case stated : 
"The foregoing reasoning and holding eff ec-
tively answers issue No. 9 inasmuch as the conc1u-
1sion necessarily excludes any theory of the existence 
of a tenancy in common as to the property of the 
corporation, tiitle being still in the old corporation. 
For purposes of liquidation, there is no tenancy in 
common." (See Ex. 3, Vol. 1, Memorandum Deci-
sion, Pages 7-8.) 
It follows that Judge Larsen's diotum in the Smith-
field West Bench Irrigation Co. case is wholly inapposite 
here. 
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However, it should be noted in passing that that dic-
tum recognizes that the corporation can tranrsfer its water 
with the "consent of the stockhdlders". As is argued in the 
body of ithe Brief, Alta did obtain the consent of fue share-
holders in conformance with the requirements of the ap-
plicable Non-Profit Corporation statute and, indeed, Ap-
pellant himself specifically consented thereto, benefited by 
the transadtlion and raitified the same. Considered in that 
posture, the case supports Respondent. 
4. Genola vs. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P. 2d 
930. 
In the Genola case, and by way of irrelevant comment, 
the author Justice srtaJted a general rule that a stockholder 
of a mutual water company has a ri.ght to demand his 
aliquot share of water from the company according to the 
method of distribution used by the company. We need not 
quarrel with this d:idum as ilt ihas no bearing on the merits 
of this case. Here, Appellant was 'afforded every right and 
privilege due him on the same bas:i:s and at the same point 
of diversion urtilized by other s:tockholders. Again we men-
tion that the findings of lthe Trial Judge to this effect are 
not challenged and the evidence is uncontroverted. 
5. St. George City vs. Kirkland, et al., 17 Utah 2d 
292, 409 P. 2d 970. 
The only conceivable relevance of this case to the case 
at bar is its ciitaltion of 'the Genola case, supra. The ques-
tion of whether or not a mutual irrigation company has 
the legal power to exchange water is not reached in either 
St. George City or Genola. 
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6. Salt Lake City vs. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 40 
Utah 126, 121 P. 592 (1911). 
We do not quarrel with the language from this case as 
quoted at pages 17 and 18 of Appellant's Brief. However, 
we challenge the suggestion there made th'at it has any 
pevtinence or applicability to any issue in the case at bar. 
7. Gunnison-Fayette Canal Co. vs .Gunnison Irriga-
tion Co., 448 P. 2d 707. 
We assume that this case must have been cirted by Ap-
pellant in support of his general contention that a mutual 
irl'igation company has no power to exchange water. We 
suggest, however, that irt holds to the contrary by making 
crystal clear the applicability of the Non-Profit Corpora-
tion statutes which expressly authorize the same. 
8. In Re Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 Pac. 748. 
S1imilarly, this case dbes not tou0h the issue for which 
cited by Appellant. In that case, the Court construed a 
Will which bequeathed real estate but was silent with re-
spect to ·W'ater represented by sitock in a mutual company 
Which admittedly had never been severed from the land 
and was still appurtenant thereto. Of significance, the 
Court there quoted With approval from 2 Weil on Water 
Rights (3rd Ed.) Sec. 12'69 as follows: 
"* * * Whether the water is appurtenant 
to the stockh1older's land is a question of fact in each 
case as is also whether on a sale of the land the 
' water righit passes as (an) appurtenance." 
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Interestingly, the Com~ there dis'tinguished George vs. 
Robinson, 23 Utah 79, 63 Pac. 819 primarily upon the 
ground th'at in the George case the waiter rights involved 
were "owned by a third person" and rthalt the "'water rights" 
had been transferred "away from the land conveyed". We 
submit that the same facts appear in the case at bar and 
that in Re Johnson's Estate must be distinguished from ithe 
in&tant case upon the same ground. 
Contrary to Appellant's contention, this case holds that 
questions of appurrtenance, severance and alienability of 
water rights turn upon the "facts", not upon arbirtrary and 
fixed rules of law. Such "facts" in the case at bar were 
found against Appellant by the Trial Judge. 
9. Arnold vs. Huntington C. & R. Association, 64 
Utah 534, 231 P. 622. 
Again, this case does not hold that a water company 
has no power to exchange water or water rights. There, 
one shareholder requested permissiron from the corporation 
to take his share of water through an alternate ditch. Per-
mission was granted by the corporaJtion. Following such 
permission, the plaintiffs abandoned the old ditch and 
spent $'2500.00 in preparing the new ditcih for use. This 
change did not inconvenience any sharehoMer or the cor-
poration. The corporation, after it "sitood by and permitted 
the plaintiffs to expend large sums of money", threatened 
to force plaintiffs 'to revert to the old, abandoned ditch. On 
these facits, both the Trial Coum and the Supreme Court 
afforded rellief to plaintiffs by enjoining the execution of 
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such threat by the corporation. However, in so doing, the 
Supreme Court ,intimates thart it would have no power or 
jurisdiction to interfere with the internal affairs of the 
corporation under circumstances such as those involved in 
the case at bar. The Court stated: 
"At first blush the writer was under the im-
pression thalt this was a case where the court was 
asked to interfere with the internal affairs of the 
corporation. Upon only slight reflection, however, 
he became convinced thart such is not the case, and 
that the Di~ricit Court has kept well within its 
powers and jurisdiction in granting the relief 
prayed for by the plaintiffs." 
In the case at bar, neither the elements of estoppel 
established by the fa0ts in tthe Arnold case nor the discrim-
ination against the plaJintiff s and in favor of other stock-
holders is present. The Trial Court specifically held to the 
contrary and those findings are sustained by the evidence. 
Those circumstances alone differentiate the two cases. 
10. Baird vs. Upper Canal & Irr. Co., et al., 70 Utah 
57, 257 P. 1060. 
Similarly, this case is not apposite to any issue now 
before this court. There, plaintiff was a minority stock-
holder and desired to utilize her share of the available 
water on properly beyond the area norma1ly served by the 
irrigation company. The company arbitrarily denied the 
pla:intiff the right to divert the water at her expense for 
use 1Jo such extended area. 'I'he court ruled that plaintiff 
was entitled to her share of available waiter and that she 
cou'ld utilize the same beyond the territorial area customar-
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ily served by the irrigation company at her own expense so 
long as she did not interfere with the rights of any other 
shareholder. 
Again, the court did not reach the question as to the 
legal power of an irrigation company to exchange water or 
water rights. However, :the court there did recognize by 
way of dictum that such a company may make other ar-
rangements 1as to the distribu1:Jion of water. lit said: 
"In the absence of any arrangement to the con-
trary, water in a mutual corporation must be de-
livered in proportion to the stock owned. The Board 
of Directors, as a maJtter of law, owes the duty to 
distribute to each stockholder his proportion of the 
water available for distribution among the s:bock-
holders." 
In the case at bar, the Trial Court did find that Ap-
pellant had been tendered his proportion of the water avail-
able for distribution among the shareholders and :that find-
ing is not attacked by Appellant 1and is suppor,ted by the 
evidence. However, the corporation in the instant case, 
made other arrangements pursuant Ibo ltlhe power vested in 
it by its Articles and the statutes of the State of Utah, as 
recogn:ized and stated in the Beggs case, supra, for a lease 
and exchange of waters which increased the amount of 
water "avail·able for distribution among the stockholders". 
Interestingly, both in the Genola case, supra, and in the 
Baird case, the water actually in issue for distribution was 
"exchange" water wh'ich had been made available for dis-
tribution through the type of "exchange agreements" which 
Appellant here attacks. 
